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Systems that make safety-critical decisions must undergo a rigorous verification and validation process to ensure
automation decisions do not jeopardize the nominal safe state of operation. Flight safety assessment andmanagement
is a high-level decision-making system to reduce loss of control risk. This paper demonstrates how tools from formal
verification can be used to guide the design of a takeoff flight safety assessment andmanagement system implemented
as a deterministic Moore machine. Finite state abstractions of simplified takeoff dynamics under different control
authorities (i.e., pilot vs safety controller) are computed and composed with theMooremachine. By construction, the
composition captures all behaviors of simplified takeoff dynamics. Then, amodel checking tool analyzes whether this
composition satisfies the takeoff safety requirements specified by federal aviation regulations. The results of model
checking togetherwith the abstraction are used to refine theMooremachine to ensure satisfaction of the specification.
This paper contributes a novel approach to verification of a supervisory system specified by a Moore machine and
applies this technique to flight safety assessment and management, which is itself an emerging flight management
automation aid.
Nomenclature
A, G = deterministic Moore machine longitudinal takeoff, output function
CLg , CDg = coefficient of lift and drag with ground effects
H, T = observation map, abstraction function
s, σ = deterministic Moore machine state, alphabet symbol
P, EA = pilot, envelope-aware controller
q, θ, γ = pitch angular rate, pitch attitude, flight-path angle
q, q = discrete state denoting a cell, discrete state denoting a facet of a cell
T,W, ρ = thrust, weight, atmospheric density
V1, VR, V lof = go∕no-go decision speed, rotation speed, liftoff speed
x, v, h = longitudinal position, airspeed, altitude
μ, g, Sref = rolling friction coefficient, acceleration due to gravity, planform area
I. Introduction
L OSS of control (LOC) is the most common contributing factor to aviation accidents [1]. LOC results when an aircraft exits its safe flightenvelope or collides with another aircraft, building, or surrounding terrain and has been widely addressed in previous research [2–8]. In our
previous publications [8–10], a flight safety assessment and management (FSAM) capability was proposed to prevent LOC during the takeoff
phase of flight. FSAM is an automation aid responsible for real-time assessment of LOC risk, activation of risk-based warnings, and resilient
control override of the flight crew if necessary. Safety-critical flight systems such as FSAMmust undergo a rigorous validation and verification
process to ensure they meet the necessary safety certification criteria.
Verification and validation (V&V) are essential steps in the traditional V model [11] for system engineering, as illustrated in Fig. 1 [12]. The
system is designed, built, and then tested comprehensively to ensure that all specified system requirements are satisfied. Validation asks the
question “arewe building the right system?” and verification asks the question “arewe building the system correctly per the specifications?” This
conventional approach (Fig. 1) can be labor-intensive and costly but has been shown to be an effective means to organize system development.
Formal methods such as model checking [13] and deductive techniques [14] efficiently augment the traditional simulation and testing-based
V&V [11]. Formalmethods help establish the correctness of a systemdesignwith respect to specified requirements before building and testing the
system. Model checking identifies violations of the specified requirement set by exhaustively searching the state space of an abstract
representation (model) of the system. Deductive techniques such as theorem-proving use mathematical arguments to prove or disprove the
correctness of the design with respect to system requirements.
Formal verification tools are gaining traction in the aerospace industry. For example, Airbus used a model checking approach to validate the
ground spoiler functionality on the A380 aircraft [15]. Rockwell Collins used a theorem-proving approach to verify the functionality of a flight
guidance system [16,17]. Joshi et al. [18] proposed a model-based safety analysis that extends model checking with fault trees used to analyze
safety-critical components. The idea of a sandbox controller was introduced by Bak et al. [19], in which a nominal system is augmented with a
safety controller and a decision module to prevent the system from entering an unsafe state. Lygeros and Lynch [20] used an automaton-based
method to verify their traffic collision avoidance system conflict resolution algorithm.
The preceding references focus only on the verification of the system and do not consider the influence of the operator. A human factors
approach to model checking was adopted by Degani and Heymann [21]. In [21], interactions between a human operator and a machine are
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formally analyzed to guide the design of the interfaces between human and machine and to develop better training manuals. Bolton et al. [22]
presented an approach to verify human automation interaction using task analytical models. In [22], the task analytic model capturing the human
operator’s behavior is combined with a model of the system under consideration and is verified using a model checking tool.
Finite state machine formulations and tools from automata theory are used for the model checking of discrete systems (see [13,23] and
references therein). Continuous time systems can be transformed into discrete systems using various abstraction techniques (see [24] for details) to
exploit model checking methods used on discrete systems. The use of backward reachable sets [7] and forward reachable sets [25–27] have been
widely used to verify safety properties for low-dimensional hybrid systems. The use of barrier certificates for the verification of hybrid systems
was explored in [28]. A theorem-proving technique can also be used for the formal verification of hybrid systems [20]. The use of probabilistic
approaches for model checking was explored in [29,30] to facilitate the verification of higher-order systems. This work employs an abstraction-
based technique to facilitate the verification of FSAM.
Themain contributions of this paper are 1) a general approach to verify a switched control system forwhich the switching policy is realized by a
deterministic finite stateMoore machine [31] and 2) a model checking framework to guide the refinement of and verify the FSAM system against
safety requirements specified in the federal aviation regulations (FAR). Specifically, a suitable representation of the underlying state space for
takeoff FSAM is established first. Next, a discrete transition system that encodes an overapproximation of the reachable states under the available
control authorities is constructed. Finally, a composition of the discrete transition system and the finite state machine specifying the switching
protocol is constructed. The composed transition system is then used to verify requirements are always satisfiedwith SPIN [32], an existingmodel
checking tool.
In this work, simplified models that can adequately capture the takeoff dynamics for verification are used. Safety requirements for takeoff
extracted from FAR part 25 are expressed in linear temporal logic (LTL) [33], which facilitate model checking. The results of verification are also
comparedwith aMonte Carlo analysis that makes use of a higher-order nonlinear model describing takeoff dynamics. Counterexamples obtained
from the model checking process identify necessary refinements of the underlying FSAM switching protocol.
Section II provides background on the tools necessary to perform model checking. Section III presents the FSAM formulation for takeoff,
develops a simplified dynamicsmodel for takeoff that facilitates verification, defines safety requirements to satisfy during takeoff, and outlines the
proposed approach tomodel check the FSAMswitching policy. Section IV describes the proposed approach formodel checking and the results of
verification. SectionVdiscusses refinements to FSAMbased on the results of verification, and Sec.VI considers validation of FSAM. SectionVII
provides a discussion on the proposed approach, and Sec. VIII presents conclusions and future extensions.
II. Background
Model checking is the process of ensuring that a system satisfies a set of requirements. This section introduces the modeling and specification
formalisms used in this paper to enable FSAM model checking. FSAM is a switching control system and its switching policy is modeled as a
deterministic Moore machine (DMM) [8]. DMMs are finite state machines in which each state has a prescribed output. The use of a deterministic
specification for FSAM facilitates its verification using well-established tools in model checking. The underlying dynamics of the aircraft for
takeoff is abstractly represented as a discrete transition system. The safety requirements for takeoff are expressed in linear temporal logic. Formal
definitions are provided next.
A. Deterministic Moore Machine
ADMM [31] is defined by the tuple (S,S0,Σ,Λ, T , G). Here,S represents a discrete set of states, S0 ⊂ S represents an initial state,Σ is a finite
input alphabet, Λ is a finite output alphabet, and T ⊆ S × Σ × S represents a transition relation. G: S → Λ is the output function that maps each
state to the output alphabet.
B. Finite Transition Systems
A finite transition system [13] is a tuple (Q,Q0,P,Γ,Π,L) in whichQ is a set of discrete states, andQ0 is the set of initial states.P represents a
finite input/action set. Γ ⊆ Q × P ×Q is a transition relation. Π is a set of atomic propositions and L: Q → 2Π is a labeling function.
C. Linear Temporal Logic
LTL is a formal specification language [13,34] that can be used to describe a rich class of system properties. LTL is built upon a finite set of
atomic propositionsΠ plus logical operators ¬ (negation), ∨ (disjunction), and temporal/modal operators○ (next), and U (until). Properties such
as safety, reachability, invariance, and combinations of these can be expressed using LTL. The set of LTL formulas over a finite set of atomic
propositions Π can be inductively defined as follows: 1) Any atomic proposition π ∈ Π is an LTL formula. 2) If φ and ψ are LTL formulas, then
¬ φ,○ φ, φ ∨ ψ , and φU ψ are also LTL formulas. Additional operators such as ∧ (conjunction),⇒(implication), ⋄ (eventually), and□ (always)
can also be defined (see [34,35] and references therein for detailed discussions on LTL syntax and semantics). Thiswork focuses onverification of
properties expressed using the□ (always) operator. A sequence of truth assignments to the atomic propositions π ∈ Π satisfy□φ if φ is true in
every position of the sequence. In this work, LTL formulas are interpreted over time-sampled trajectories of dynamic systems (i.e., discrete-time
semantics of LTL) [36].
Fig. 1 V model for system engineering [12].
































































This section formulates the model checking problem for FSAM. First, the takeoff FSAMDMM is introduced. Next, an approximate dynamic
model for the takeoff phase is specified. Then, the safety requirements for the takeoff phase extracted fromFARpart 25 are discussed. Using these
three components, the model checking problem for FSAM is formally defined and the solution strategy used in this paper is outlined.
A. Takeoff Flight Safety Assessment and Management
Takeoff is one of the most hazardous phases of flight, second only to final approach and landing. Current takeoff regulations require that the
flight crew follow standard operating procedures to configure the aircraft appropriately, obtain clearances, and manually fly the aircraft through
initial departure climb [37].
FSAM is a high-level flightmanagement system decision aid responsible for real-time assessment of LOC risk, activation of risk-basedwarnings,
and resilient control override of the flight crew if necessary. In previouswork, FSAMwas applied to the prevention of LOCduring takeoff [8–10] but
the FSAM capability is still in early stages of development. Figure 2 illustrates a manually constructed DMMA: S;S0;Σ;Λ;T ;G that represents
FSAMlogic for the longitudinal dynamics of takeoff.A formal representation of theDMMisprovided in theAppendixof this paper. Each state s ∈ S
or node in Fig. 2 represents a segment of takeoff. The input alphabet Σ consists of symbols that depend on the physical state of the aircraft (see
Table A1). Each edge in Fig. 2 represents a transition (s, σ, s 0) over input alphabet symbol σ ∈ Σ labeling the edge between states s, s 0 ∈ S.
Λ  fP;EAg is the output alphabet, in whichP denotes that the pilot is in control and EA denotes that an envelope-aware safety controller is active.
The output of each state Gs ∈ Λ, indicated in the lower half of each node, determines the current control authority.
The DMM in Fig. 2 was constructed after analysis of aviation accident and incident reports, aircraft manuals, and safety briefings [8]. The goal
was to develop a switching strategy that could recognize high-risk states during the takeoff ground roll and activate an envelope-aware controller
tomitigate risk. The top row in Fig. 2 represents the nominal progression of states during the takeoff ground runwith the pilot in control. As shown
in Fig. 2, the aircraft starts from an initial state of rest s1 at x  0, v  0. If the aircraft is configured for takeoff c and takeoff thrust Tmax is
established, the aircraft accelerates down the runway and theDMMstate transitions through the nominalV-speed state progression. The top rowof
states in Fig. 2 represents the nominal V-speed sequence. The additional states represent off-nominal conditions with LOC risk. If the aircraft is
inappropriately configured, the DMM enters Takeoff Configuration Warning (TOCW) state s8, inducing a corresponding alert to the crew. If the
configuration problem persists, the DMM transitions into the abort state s13, where it overrides and rejects the takeoff. During the initial ground
roll Vmcg < V ≤ V1, if the aircraft has inadequate acceleration, FSAM rejects the takeoff f to prevent entry into unsafe regions of the state space
with respect to rejected takeoff and one engine inoperative [8]. At higher speeds, the DMMmonitors crew inputs to avoid premature rotation and
tail strike (s4 and s5). After liftoff, conventional envelope protection features such as angle of attack (stall) and overspeed become active. Pushing
the aircraft to the stall boundary during the climb (s6, s7) results in override, where the FSAM-activated envelope-aware controller (s11, s12)
effectively offers the stall or envelope protection capabilities found on the existing aircraft. FSAMreverts control to the flight crew after the aircraft
is stabilized on climbout. This paper focuses on verifying, validating, and refining the manually constructed longitudinal DMMdeveloped in our
previous work to ensure the satisfaction of takeoff safety requirements.
B. Longitudinal Dynamics for Takeoff
To illustrate verification of the longitudinal FSAM DMM, the following simplifying assumptions are made:
1) The lateral dynamics is well behaved (i.e., there are no lateral disturbances, and so the aircraft canmaintain runway headingwhile staying on
runway centerline throughout takeoff).
2) The engines, control surfaces, instruments, and all subsystems function nominally.
3) There is no runway incursion risk.
4) The only pilot behaviors impacting FSAM decisions are related to captured configuration settings and control inputs.
5) Envelope-aware control and guidance algorithms are capable of maintaining or recovering a safe state in any DMM in which the envelope-
aware controller is active.
Verification of a system like FSAM requires the consideration of human pilot behavior. Several authors have developed models to describe
human pilot behavior under different scenarios [21,22,38]. The preceding assumptions enable the usage of simple pilot behavior models (human
operator transfer functions [39]) in verifying the FSAM DMM.
The full nonlinear equations describing the dynamics of the aircraft during takeoff were discussed in our previous publications [8,9]. The
preceding assumptions allow this work to ignore lateral or directional dynamics. Furthermore, takeoff is decomposed into two segments: ground
roll and climb. In the ground roll segment, the aircraft accelerates down the runway while the pitch attitude stays almost constant until achieving
rotation airspeedVR. At or aboveVR, the pilot applies control inputs to rotate the nose of the aircraft.When liftoff speedV lof is reached, the aircraft
climbs (note V lof > VR). Thus, the longitudinal dynamics for takeoff can be split into the segments V < V lof and V ≥ V lof :
Fig. 2 Longitudinal FSAMMoore machine for takeoff.

































































v v < V lof
v cosγ0 v ≥ V lof ; _v 

A1 − B1v2 v < V lof
A2 − B2v2 v ≥ V lof
; _h 

0 v < V lof
v sinγ0 v ≥ V lof ; _q 

A3q B3ue v < VR
A4q B4ue v ≥ VR ;
_θ  q (1)
in which x is the longitudinal position of the aircraft, v is airspeed, θ is pitch, q is angular rate, h is altitude, and γ is flight-path angle. TermsA1,B1,





























Here, T represents the takeoff thrust,W is aircraft takeoff weight, ρ is atmospheric density, μ is the wheel rolling friction coefficient, γ0 is the
flight-path angle after lift off, Sref is the planform area, andCLg andCDg are the coefficients of lift and drag, respectively, including aerodynamic
ground effect and the impact of nominal takeoff flaps/slat settings. Pitch dynamics are approximated as a piecewise linear system defined by the
pair (A3, B3) when v < VR and (A4, B4) when v ≥ VR.
For convenience, Eq. (1) is represented compactly as _X  fX;U. Here,X ∈ X ⊆ R5 represents the state vector x; v; h; θ; qT, inwhichX is a
compact hyperrectangle;U ∈ Ω ⊆ R represents the elevator control input ue; and fP;EAg are the available control authorities. The elevator input
provided by the pilot uetjp is given as
uetjP 

Kpθref1 − θt − τ  Kdq if v ≥ Vr
Kpθref2 − θt − τ  Kdq if v < Vr
(2)
Equation (2) represents a simple human operator model [39,41] that treats the pilot as a proportional-derivative feedback lawwith a time delay.
Here,Kp is a proportional feedback gain,Kd is a derivative gain, and τ is the time delay; θt − τ represents the inherent lag in pilot response due to
time taken for perception of and reaction to external stimuli and neuromuscular interactions [39,41]; θref1 is the appropriate pitch reference attitude
during rotation; θref2 is the reference pitch attitude before rotation (ideally zero); and θref − θt − τ is the error in tracking the appropriate rotation
attitude θref . Vr denotes the rotation airspeed perceived by the pilot and ideally would be equal to VR. Equation (2) represents a typical pilot
behavior during takeoff. Although specification of expected values would be possible for certain parameters, such as θref and Vr, specific
parameter values such asKp,Kd, and τwould be pilot dependent. For example, it is rare for any two pilots to have the same response time, thus τ
varies between pilots. The delay τ can also be influenced by several other factors, such as time of day, runway conditions, etc. The specific
parameters are also different for each takeoff due to pilot input and environmental differences. In this work, it is assumed that the values of θref ,Vr,
Kp,Kd, and τ liewithin a bounded interval θrefmin ; θrefmax , Vrmin ; Vrmax , Kpmin ; Kpmax , Kdmin ; Kdmax , and τmin; τmax, respectively, for a given pilot.
When off-nominal conditions are encountered during takeoff, FSAM transfers control to the envelope-aware (EA) safety controller that





K1θref1 − θt  K2q if θt < θPR & v < VR
K3θref2 − θt  K4q if θt ≥ θPR & v < VR
K5θref3 − θt  K6q if θt < θTS & v ≥ VR
K7θref4 − θt  K8q if θt ≥ θTS & ht < hTS & v ≥ VR
(3)
Here, Ki, i  1; : : : ; 8 and θrefj , j  1; : : : ; 4 are chosen such that the closed-loop response of the aircraft is free from high-risk states such as
premature rotation and tail strikes; θTS, hTS represents the threshold when tail strike protection is activated, whereas θPR represents the threshold
when prevention against premature rotation is activated. Specific numerical values of parameters used in this work are given in the Appendix (see
Table A3).
C. Safety Requirements for Takeoff Phase
The goal of the takeoff FSAM system is to prevent LOC during takeoff. Thus, the primary requirement for FSAM is to ensure that the system
does not ever enter an unsafe state. A discussion of safe and unsafe states during takeoff can be found in [8]. For the purpose of illustration, in this
paper, the primary focus is onverifying safety requirements or properties specified in part 25 [42] of the FAR (Airworthiness Standards: Transport
CategoryAircraft). This paper verifies that the longitudinal FSAMDMM(Fig. 2)meets the requirements listed inTable 1. These requirements can
be found in the FAR part 25 under subpart 25.111. Table 1 also provides the LTL expression for each requirement. In Table 1, θng is the pitch
attitude at which the nose gear first leaves the ground, θ0 is the pitch attitude that provides a nonnegative flight-path angle
§, θtail is the pitch attitude
at which the tail contacts the ground before liftoff (i.e., when h ≤ hlof), and hobs is the nominal obstacle clearance height, typically 35 ft for
commercial aircraft [42].
Table 1 Requirements and their LTL specifications
No. Requirement LTL specification
1 During acceleration to speed V2, the nose gear may be raised off the ground at a speed not less than VR [FAR 25.111.(b)]. □θ ≥ θng → V ≥ VR
2 The pitch attitude of the airplane must not exceed an attitude that leads to the minimum tail clearance during rotation
[FAR 25.107.(e).4].
□h ≤ hlof → θ < θtail
3 The slope of the airborne part of the takeoff path must be positive at each point [FAR 25.111.(c).1]. □h > hlof → θ > θ0
4 The airplane must reach V2 before it is 35 feet above the takeoff surface [FAR 25.111.(c).2]. □h ≥ hobs → V ≥ V2
§Note that, during takeoff, angle of attack α is positive and hence, a positive pitch attitude corresonds to a positive flight-path angle.































































D. Verification Problem Specification and Approach
Let f· denote the dynamics of takeoff and letReachf; IA denote the set of states reachable from the set of initial conditions I as governed by
the switching strategy imposed by the FSAM DMM A. Let U denote the set of unsafe states identified by the requirements (e.g., Table 1). The
safety verification problem then reduces to checking the validity of the following expression [27]:
Reachf; IA ∩ U  ϕ (4)
Computation of the reachable set Reachf; IA can be challenging, especially if the underlying dynamics f is nonlinear [24]. Several authors
have developed different approaches to compute reachable sets. The successes of these approaches are typically determined by the representations
used to approximate the reachable sets. In this paper, a discrete overapproximation [27,43] of the dynamics in the form of a finite transition system
is developed with the following steps: 1) Define a set of atomic propositions over the state space of the dynamics. These atomic propositions are
used to express the requirements and also constitute inputs received by the FSAMDMM. 2)Abstract the dynamics as a finite transition system that
takes into account the behavior of the pilot and the EA controller. 3) Compose the abstraction with FSAM to obtain an overapproximation of the
closed-loop behavior. To verify Eq. (4), an automaton-theoretic approach is used wherein the overapproximation of the closed-loop behavior and
system requirements (constraints)Φ are used as inputs to a model checker. Themodel checker searches for any violation of requirementsΦ in the
state space of the givenmodel. If violations are detected, themodel checker returns a counterexample (a sequence of states in the givenmodel) that
illustrates howa requirement is violated. In thiswork, the existingmodel checker SPIN [32] is used. The three steps of thismodel checking process
are discussed in detail next.
IV. Verification of Takeoff FSAM
A. State-Space Abstraction
The first step to verification requires defining a set of atomic propositions formodel checking. These preceding propositions capture thresholds
essential to verify requirements. The requirements defined earlier are only related to airspeed V, pitch θ, and altitude h, yielding propositionsΠV ,
Πθ,ΠH . Here,ΠV  fπv1; : : : ; πv8g is the set of propositions that defines a discrete set of airspeed values,Πθ  fπθ1; : : : ; πθ5g defines a discrete
set of pitch values, and ΠH  fπH1; : : : ; πH4g defines a discrete set of altitude values. The propositions (shown in Table 2) are chosen such that
they partition the state spacewith sufficient resolution to capture safe versus unsafe states relevant to the requirements. The airspeed is partitioned
with respect to the various V-speed constraints. The pitch and altitude states are partitioned to capture unsafe states such as tail strikes and
premature rotations.¶ For example, a tail strike (a state in which the tail of the aircraft strikes the runway) is identified by the propositions indicated
in Fig. 3.
Next, an observation mapH: X → 2Π maps each state X ∈ X to atomic propositions in 2Π. For example, let X  x; v; h; θ; q, in which
0 ≤ v < Vmcg, θ1 ≤ θ < θ2, and h1 ≤ h < h2. In this case, HX  fπv1; πθ1; πh1g. Note that each state X ∈ X belongs to a polytope (a
hyperrectangle) formed by the set fH−1πvi ×H−1πθj ×H−1πhkg. Thus, the set of states inX mapped to the same set of atomic propositions
byH leads to a partition of the state spaceX . A discrete state from a finite setQ ≔ f q1; : : : ; qng is associated with each element of this partition.
As a result, the observation map induces the abstraction T: X → Q, which maps each state X ∈ X into the finite setQ. The map T is proposition
preserving if and only if
TX1  TX2 ⇒ HX1  HX2; ∀ X1; X2 ∈ X (5)
Equation (5) indicates that any two states belonging to the same cell satisfy the same set of atomic propositions. LetF ( T−1 q) denote the set of
X ∈ X that belongs to the facets of the polytope T−1 q. (A facet of a polytope of n dimensions is a face that has n − 1 dimensions.) In this paper,
an element q ∈ Q is referred to as a cell instead of explicitly denoting a cell as T−1 q, and qi ∈ F q is referred to as the ith facet of cell q.
The atomic propositions inTable 2 are chosen such that a switch to a different control authority dictated byFSAMalways occurs at a facet of cell
q ∈ Q. Furthermore, a transition to an unsafe cell must pass through the facet of the unsafe cell. Hence, for the verification of FSAM according to
Eq. (4), it is sufficient to assure that all reachable facets fromagiven initial facet do not contain any facets of unsafe cells. Thus, the goal is to find all
possible transitions between facets of all cells in Q.
B. Discrete Representation of Reachable States
In principle, given a proposition-preserving partition and the dynamics, it is possible to use the methods in [7,25,34,44–46] to compute a
discrete abstraction of the reachable states based on system dynamics. However, it is possible to simplify construction of the discrete abstraction
by exploiting structural properties of the underlying dynamics and requirements. For instance, the states vt and ht as described by the
dynamics in Eq. (1) are monotonically increasing functions of time in the region of interest. Furthermore, pitch response is governed by a linear
system. These dynamics do not contain invariant sets inX . The requirements discussed in Sec. III.C are only invariance requirements [13]. These
properties simplify construction of a discrete abstraction of the reachable states.
Table 2 Atomic propositions
ΠV Πθ ΠH
πv1 ≔ 0 ≤ v < Vmcg πθ1 ≔ θ1 ≤ θ < θ2 πH1 ≔ h1 ≤ h < h2
πv2 ≔ Vmcg ≤ v < V1 πθ2 ≔ θ2 ≤ θ < θ3 πH2 ≔ h2 ≤ h < h3
πv3 ≔ V1 ≤ v < Vrmin πθ3 ≔ θ3 ≤ θ < θ4 πH3 ≔ h3 ≤ h < h4
πv4 ≔ Vrmin ≤ v < VR πθ4 ≔ θ4 ≤ θ < θ5 — —
πv5 ≔ VR ≤ v < Vrmax πθ5 ≔ θ5 ≤ θ < θ6 — —
πv6 ≔ Vrnax ≤ v < V lof — — — —
πv7 ≔ V lof ≤ v < V2 — — — —
πv8 ≔ V2 ≤ v < Vfp — — — —
¶Though this work uses an 8 × 5 × 3 partition, any proposition-preserving partition with sufficient resolution could be used.































































The method used to construct the discrete abstraction is shown in Algorithm 1. Inputs include discrete state-space partition Q, the takeoff
dynamics model f, and the two controller formulations (P, EA) described by Eqs. (2) and (3). The algorithm returns a discrete transition system
B ≔ Q;Q0;P;ΓB;Π;L for which the states Q represent facets of the cells in the partition. The actions PfP;EAg denote the two control
authorities and ΓB describes the transitions between facets under the two control authorities. The function isReach (q, k, q 0) returns true if, for
k ∈ fP;EAg, there exists t0, t1,Xt0 ∈ q,Xt1 ∈ q 0 such thatXt ∈ q for all t ∈ t0; t1, inwhich q is the cell containing the two facets q and q 0.
The function isReach (q, k, q 0) can in general be evaluated using methods described in [25,26,46,47]. A description of the isReach (q, k, q 0)
function used in this work and specific numerical values describing the state-space partition can be found in the Appendix (see Table A3).
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to construct the discrete transition system
Inputs: state-space partitions Q, dynamics f, control inputs uetjP, and uetjEA
1) Initialize transition system B  Q;Q0;P;ΓB;Π;L in whichQ  qjq ∈ F q; ∀ q ∈ Q, P  P;EA, Π  fΠV;ΠH;ΠΘg, ΓB  f g
2) for k in fP;EAg
3) for q in Q
4) for qi in F  q
5) for qj in F  q
6) if (isReach(qi, k, qj))
7) //Add transition to discrete system B if valid transition exists.
8) ΓB  ΓB ∪ fqi; k; qjg
9) for qi in Q
10) for qj in Q
11) for qm in F qi
12) for qn in F qj
13) if (qm ≡ qn)
14) //Add transitions between facets that are common to adjacent cells.
15) ΓB  ΓB ∪ fqm; k; qng
16) Return B
Each state q ∈ Q inB contains transitions induced by the pilotP and the envelope-aware safety controller. However, the goal of this paper is to
verify transitions at each state that are governed byFSAM.Therefore, those transitions inB that are induced by the control authority dictated by the
FSAMDMMat each discrete state q ∈ Q are extracted by constructing the composition (product) of the transition systemB and FSAMDMMA.
C. Composite Transition System
The composition of the discrete transition system B ≔ Q;Q0;P;ΓB;Π;L and the FSAM DMM A ≔ S;S0;Σ;Λ; T ;G yields a new
transition system C ≔ D;D0;P;ΓC;Π;L, in which D  Q × S and D0  Q0 × S0. Let di, dj ∈ D, in which di  q; s and dj  q 0; s 0.
Then, di; p; dj ∈ ΓC if and only if q; p; q 0 ∈ ΓB and s; σ; s 0 ∈ T , in which p  Gs and σ  Lq 0. In other words, the composite
transition system denotes the parallel evolution of the states in the transition systemB and FSAMDMMA. Note that, in the composite transition
system C, the inputs p to discrete states q are the outputs of DMM state s. This ensures the composite transition system C contains only those
transitions in B that are governed by the control authority selected by FSAM. This composite transition system serves as the model for the model
checking process because it depicts the behavior of the aircraft during takeoff as governed by FSAM. Thus, the goal inverification is to ensure that
model C satisfies the requirements imposed on takeoff in Sec. III.C. Figure 4 illustrates this composition process.
Proposition: If the composed transition system C does not violate the specifications, then the simplified dynamicmodel governed by the FSAM
switching control law does not violate the specification.
Proof: By construction, the composed transition system C contains all behaviors of the simplified dynamics under FSAM’s switching control
law. Therefore, the reachable set of the composed system C contains the reachable set of the simplified dynamics under the switching control law
governed by FSAM.
D. Model Checking
The requirements Φ for model checking expressed in LTL with the propositions defined in the previous section are as follows:
Φ1 ≔ □θ ≥ θng → V ≥ VR  □πθ4 ∨ πθ5 → πv4 ∨ πv5 ∨ πv6
Φ2 ≔ □h < hlof → θ < θtail  □πH1 ∨ πH2 → πθ1 ∨ πθ2 ∨ πθ3 ∨ πθ4
Φ3 ≔ □h ≥ hlof → θ ≥ θ0  □¬πH1 ∨ πH2 → ¬ πθ1
Φ4 ≔ □h ≥ hobs → V ≥ V2  □πH4 → πv6 (6)
The composed transition system C and requirements Φ are input into the SPIN model checker. Figure 5 illustrates an overview of model
checking. If the model satisfies all requirements, the verification is considered complete. If violations exist, analysis of each counterexample is
essential to understand why requirements are violated, as well as what changes to the logic or control laws are needed to prevent such violations.
Analysis can help distinguish counterexamples that could be false positives. Most often, false positives are artifacts of the abstraction technique
itself, and so it is possible to use these counterexamples to refine the abstractions in a manner that eliminates false positives [48,49].
Fig. 3 Partitions that enable identification of a tail strike.































































Using the precedingmodel checking approach, requirementsΦ1 andΦ2 were violated with the baseline DMMshown in Fig. 2. In other words,
the underlying FSAM logic could not prevent premature rotations and tail strikes.
V. Refinement of FSAM
As discussed earlier, the model checker revealed that requirementsΦ1 andΦ2 were violated in C. Three causes were identified: 1) specific pilot
behaviors could result in the violation, 2) the EA controller could be poorly designed and/or inadequate to deal with the off-nominal conditions,
and/or 3) the switching logic (FSAMDMM)might be incorrect/incomplete. According to the system dynamics in Eq. (1),Φ1 could be violated if
the pilot rotates the nose of the aircraft in the Vmcg ≤ V < V1 airspeed range. This is because protection against premature rotation while in the
Vmcg ≤ V < V1 airspeed rangewas not available inA.Φ2 could be violated if the pilot chose to delay the rotation until after achieving V lof speed
was reached due to an omission of tail strike protection in A outside the airspeed range VR ≤ V < V lof . After analyzing the preceding
counterexamples, appropriate changes to the FSAM’s DMMAwere made. These changes are highlighted in Fig. 6 and were also carried into our
archival FSAM [8] DMMspecification. The updated DMMprotects from tail strikes via new transitions, indicated by the dashed lines. Transition
(s3 → s9) prevents a premature rotation initiated before V1 and the transition (s10 → s11) prevents a tail strike by activating the tail strike
protection EAcontroller if the aircraft is still on the ground after theV lof airspeed.Model checkingwas repeatedwith the updatedDMM, verifying
that both requirements Φ1 and Φ2 were now satisfied.
Fig. 5 Model checking process.
Fig. 4 Composition of a transition system with a DMM.































































AMonte Carlo analysiswas performed using the full nonlinear equations ofmotion describing takeoff dynamics (see [8] for a description of the
full nonlinear dynamics). The pilot and EA controller inputs were chosen as described in Eqs. (2) and (3). Switching between control authorities
was determined by the FSAM DMM. The EA controller [Eq. (3)] was deterministic. For the pilot model [Eq. (2)], parameters characterizing
pilots’ behavior (θref , Vr, Kp, Kd, τ) were randomly sampled from a uniform distribution within the intervals θrefmin ; θrefmax , Vrmin ; Vrmax ,Kpmin ; Kpmax , Kdmin ; Kdmax , and τmin; τmax, respectively, for each Monte Carlo trial. The domain of the parameters are chosen such that the
different pilot behaviors of interest can be simulated. For example, sampling Vr from low airspeed ranges forces the pilot to initiate pitch rotation
prematurely. Similarly, by samplingKp, θref from high-gain and high-pitch angle ranges, respectively, tail-strike events are observed. EachMonte
Carlo trial is initialized at x  0, v  0, h  0, θ  0, and q  0. The numerical values of all parameters used in theMonte Carlo simulation are
listed in Table A3. Figure 7 illustrates the aircraft responses after several Monte Carlo trials with the original uncorrected FSAMDMM. Figure 7
shows many instances of tail strikes (i.e., θ ≥ θtail and h < hlof) even though the original DMM was formulated to prevent such scenarios. The
Monte Carlo trials with the corrected DMM exhibited no high-risk rotation or tail-strike events (see Fig. 8).
VI. Validation of FSAM and FAR
TheMonteCarlo simulations discussed in the preceding section confirm that the refinementsmade in response to the counterexamples obtained
frommodel checking prevent the occurrence of tail strikes. Themodel checking approach formally guarantees that the FSAM logic is correct with
respect to the specified requirements, takeoff dynamics, and pilot and EA controller models. However, verification of FSAMwith respect to FAR
requirements may be insufficient to ensure safety across the spectrum of real-world missions. This leads to additional questions: Are the right
requirements being enforced, and is the takeoff logic complete with respect to LOC prevention? These questions are addressed with a scenario
aimed to provoke careful thought about generalized requirements.
Consider a scenario in which a general aviation (GA) aircraft executes a soft-field takeoff (e.g., from a grass strip after a recent rain).** The goal
of a soft-field takeoff is to minimize the load on the nose gear and become airborne as soon as possible. Soft-field takeoff operating procedures
require maintaining a nose-up attitude during the initial ground roll. This enables the airplane to become airborne. The airplane then accelerates
while in ground effect until the required climb speed is achieved. In this scenario, requirementΦ1 may not help the pilot establish a safe takeoff,
particularly if FSAM and the EA controller were not analyzed with consideration of the soft-field takeoff. The transition s3 → s9 according to the
revised DMM in Fig. 6 would then potentially prevent the pilot from maintaining acceptable loads on the nose gear. This may result in the nose
Fig. 7 Monte Carlo simulations of takeoff phase with original FSAM DMM.
Fig. 6 Revised FSAM DMM.
**GA is covered in a separate FAR section, but tail strike is still an issue.































































gear digging into the soft field, increasing the rolling friction and potentially leading to runway excursion or even tipover in an extreme case.With
a short as well as soft field, failing to efficiently become airborne may also lead to poor climb performance or runway excursion.
TheFSAMDMMhas been revised (see Fig. 6) to ensure satisfaction of FAR requirementΦ1, but itmay not bevalidwith respect to aGAaircraft
performing a soft-field takeoff. Typically, a conflict identified during validation can be addressed by modifying the initial requirements to
accommodate the conflicting operational needs or, if possible, by modifying the design of a system to address the conflict. Thus, it is essential to
modify the requirementΦ1 according to runway type and also modify the design ofA by adding states and transitions that account for soft-field
takeoffs. An FSAMDMM for a soft-field takeoff would allow early rotation, while preventing a tail strike. It would also prevent excessive nose-
down control inputs to minimize load on the nose wheel. It is worth noting that FAR requirement Φ1 is not complete with respect to different
takeoff strategies, such as the cited soft-field takeoff example. This example illustrates the importance of applying each requirement in exactly
those contexts in which it is actually required. As this example illustrates, the FSAM verification process must always take into account pertinent
operational requirements in addition to baseline FAR.
VII. Discussion
This paper proposed a model checking framework to verify and (manually) refine, when necessary, the design of an FSAM system against
safety requirements. Pilot behavior was encoded using an uncertain transfer function model, and an envelope-aware controller was used for the
autopilot mode. Simplified equations for takeoff dynamics were used to construct an overapproximation on which model checking was
performed. The simplified dynamics presented in this paper adequately captures events such as premature rotation, tail strikes, and runway
overruns. Also, this model leverages the underlying structural properties such as monotonicity and linearity required to construct the discrete
transition system.
The process of constructing the discrete transition system that describes the reachable facets for each controller (P and EA) separately, and then
merging them according to the switching strategy imposed by FSAM, promotes understanding of how each controller affects the nominal system.
This enables a comprehensive analysis of counterexamples obtained from the model checker, which in turn facilitates identifying necessary
changes to underlying DMM logic. It also leads to incremental changes in the design. Note that other anomalous or exceptional conditions (wind,
loading, performance, system failure, etc.) must also be considered in the requirements and DMM for a comprehensive takeoff DMM capability.
Achieving truly complete knowledge of behaviors remains a challenge for system designers, as well as both automation and human crews.
In this work, the discrete states in the transition systems abstractly represented facets of the cells in the state-space partition. Algorithm 1
explicitly enumerates all cells in the state-space partition and checks for transitions between facets of a given cell. This can become tedious,
especially if there are a large number of cells in the state-space partition. However, it is possible to only check the transitions between facets of cells
that are reachable from a given initial cell. It is also possible to consider an abstraction that directly represents the cells instead of the cell facets. In
this case, it is sufficient to check the transitions between cells instead of facets. This in turn would speed up construction of discrete transition
system (B). However, this type of abstract representation yieldedmany counterexamples duringmodel checking, due to nondeterminism induced
in the abstract model, which turned out to be false positives.
It is also possible to automate the FSAM logic refinement process using tools such as Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement (see
Refs. [48,49]). However, automating refinement risks a final DMM result that is not physically intuitive or readable. For a manually constructed
DMM, the DMM design team needs to also verify that modifications are consistent with user interface needs.
The full aircraft takeoff dynamics model described in [8,9] is a higher-order nonlinear model that combines a traditional aircraft dynamics
model with the landing gear (oleo strut andwheel) dynamics and facilitatesmodeling the aircraft’s response to differential braking inputs and nose
wheel steering inputs during takeoff. In principle, it is possible to consider more complex nonlinear dynamics within the proposed framework and
use methods described in [7,25–27,46,47,50] within Algorithm 1.
VIII. Conclusions
This paper contributes a model checking framework that enables formal verification of manually constructed DMM formulations and applies
this method to the takeoff FSAM system. The switched systems is verified via three main steps: 1) select an abstract representation of the
underlying state space, 2) construct a discrete transition system that overapproximates the reachable states under the various control authorities,
and 3) compose the discrete transition system and the switching logic represented as a DMM. This verification procedure is applied to an FSAM
DMM for takeoff based on FAR part 25 safety requirements. Simplifying assumptions enable leveraging existing algorithms to perform
Fig. 8 Monte Carlo simulations of the takeoff phase with revised FSAM DMM.































































reachability analysis and model checking. Model checking results were also cross validated with a Monte Carlo analysis using full nonlinear
dynamics to eliminate false positives. This paper has also illustrated that model checking can be used to guide/help a system engineer to refine the
system design in addition to proving correctness of the system.
For a comprehensive verification of FSAM, one needs to consider different scenarios, such as rejected takeoffs, engine failure scenarios,
crosswind conditions, and more. In such cases, the simplified models described in this paper must be replaced by models that can adequately
capture the behaviors of interest for verification. Abstractions should also consider other state variables such as heading and longitudinal and
cross-track position to capture safe versus unsafe states. It is important to recognize that FSAM only activates when safety is verifiable, and so
unhandled cases will result in a need for appropriate crew response. Selecting the right set of requirements plays a crucial role in validating the
system. To facilitate verification of FSAM against complex scenarios, work is underway to develop a statistical model checking framework that
makes use of Monte Carlo simulations to establish probabilistic guarantees on requirement satisfaction. The use of formal methods reduces the
need to run extensive flight tests to study the behavior of the overall system. However, a number of factors, such as pilot interfaces and acceptance,
must still be considered. Although work remains, the deterministic models presented in this paper are verifiable and thus ultimately certifiable
using current regulation practices.
Appendix A: Longitudinal Deterministic Moore Machine [8]
The longitudinal FSAMDMMgoverns the decision-making process with respect to the longitudinal dynamics of the aircraft during takeoff. It
is designed to prevent events that could severely impact ground roll performance of the aircraft, including inappropriate crew inputs such as
improper rejected takeoff and improper rotations. Because the V speeds are vital for takeoff decision making and are intuitive for pilots, a state
formulation for the DMM that captures the critical V-speed thresholds is employed.
The longitudinal (lg) Moore machine Alg is represented as the tuple (Slg, Slg 0, Σlg, Λlg, T lg, Glg), in which
Slg  fs1; s2; s3; s4; s5; s6; s7; s8; s9; s10; s11; s12; s13; s14; s15g (A1)
Slg 0  fs1g (A2)
Σlg  fVmcg; V1; VR; V lof ; V2; Vfp; Tidle; Tmax; c; c 0; e; e 0; f; θ; θg (A3)
Λlg  fP;EAg (A4)
Glg 

P if si ∈ fs1; s2; s3; s4; s5; s6; s7; s8; s14g
EA otherwise
(A5)
Transitions T lg are illustrated as edges in a directed graph (Fig. 2). The definition of each alphabet symbol in the setΣlg is provided in Table A1.
In this work, it is assumed that the engines, instruments, and control surfaces function nominally and there is no need for a rejected takeoff. Also,
the aircraft is appropriately configured for takeoff and does not exit the flight envelopes after becoming airborne. Consequently, the DMM
execution does not encounter the Tidle, c
0, f, and e 0 input symbols. The relation between the DMM alphabet symbols used in this work and the
atomic propositions required to construct the composite transition system discussed in Sec. IV.C is provided in Table A2.
Table A1 Input alphabet symbols for the takeoff Moore machine
Alphabet Σ Description
Vmcg Minimum controllable ground speed with one engine inoperative
V1 Takeoff decision speed (go/no-go speed)
VR Rotation speed
V lof Liftoff speed
V2 Takeoff safety speed
Vfp Minimum flap retraction speed
Tmax Takeoff thrust setting
Tidle Idle thrust setting
c Aircraft configured for takeoff
c 0 Improper takeoff configuration
e Envelope protection deactivated
e 0 Envelope protection activated
f Inadequate acceleration performance
θPR Premature rotation
θTS Maximum allowable pitch attitude reached during rotation































































Appendix B: Reachability Analysis
AlgorithmA1describes the isReach( ) function used byAlgorithm1. It takes as inputs two facetsq and q 0 of a cell and returns true, if under the current
control authoritypk there exists a trajectory starting from q and ending in q
0, while remainingwithin the cell containing the two facets. Themain idea in
Algorithm A1 is to exploit the fact that the airspeed and altitude [in Eq. (1)] monotonically increase with time (in the region of interest) and the pitch
dynamics is piecewise affine, therefore, it is enough to propagate the extreme points of the facet. Algorithm A1 propagates the initial condition
X0  x0; v0; h0; θ0; q0 obtained from each vertex of facet q, until the ensuing trajectory leaves the cell, to determine if facet q 0 is reachable from q. (To
be more precise, one can propagate δ expansions of facets because a time-sampled trajectory might not intersect the facet, but will be within some δ
neighborhood of it, in which δ can be inferred from the sampling time and the Lipschitz constant of the dynamics [36].) Because this work considers
discrete-time semantics of LTL, state propagation is performed using the discrete-time version of the system dynamics in Eq. (1). In Algorithm A1, f
denotes the discrete-time equivalent of f. Each vertex of facet q provides initial conditions for airspeed v0, pitch θ0, and altitude h0. The longitudinal
position x0 is initialized at zero because the requirements considered in this paper do not impose restrictions on x. If v < Vr, the pitch rateq0 is initialized
at zero. This is because the pitch remains constant until rotation, and therefore the pitch rate is zero. However, for v ≥ Vr, q0 ∈ fqmin; qmaxg. Here, qmin
and qmax denote theminimum andmaximum attainable pitch rate during takeoff.Vq ⊂ R5 denotes the set of initial conditions for a facet q. Note that,
because the pilot model described by Eq. (2) consists of the parameters θref , Vr,Kp,Kd, and τ, for which the values are assumed to lie within bounded
intervals, each initial condition for pk  P is propagated for all possible extreme values of the parameters (i.e, Kp ∈ fKpmin ; Kpmaxg, Kd ∈fKdmin ; Kdmaxg, θref ∈ fθrefmin ; θrefmaxg,Vr ∈ fVrmin ; Vrmaxg, and τ ∈ fτmin; τmaxg). Forpk  EA, the controller parameters are known exactly and hence
each initial condition is propagated only once. Kpk; X denotes the set of controller parameters for the given control authority pk that are used to
construct the control law. Uη denotes the controller input constructed according to Eq. (2) (when pk  P) or Eq. (3) (when pk  EA) using the
parameters η  θref ; Vr; Kp; Kd; τ. Note that AlgorithmA1 requires the initialization of the delay term in the pilot controlmode described byEq. (2).
This is achieved by reversing the dynamics and estimating upper and lower bounds on θn −m for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Algorithm A1 Function isReach( )
Function: isReach(q, pk, q
0)
1) for X0 in Vq
2) X  X0
3) for η in Kpk; X
4) qi ≔ qj ≔ F−1q
5) where as qj  qi
6) X 0 ≔ fX;Uη
7) qj ≔ TX 0
8) X 0 ≔ X
9) if qj ≠ qi
10) if q 0 ∈ F  qi ∩ F  qj
11) return true
12) return false
Appendix C: Numerical Values
Parameter numerical values used in this paper are given in Table A3. The aircraft physical parameters, such as m, Sref ,
and c, were obtained from [51]. The maximum thrust value was obtained from [52]. CLg , CDg , μ were chosen based on [40].
Table A2 Mapping between




V1 πv3 ∨ πv4
VR πv5 ∨ πv6
V lof πv7
V2 πv8
θPR πθ2 ∧ πH1
θTS πθ5 ∧ πH1
Table A3 Numerical parameters
Parameters Values
m, Sref , Iyy 45,420 kg, 122.4 m
2, 0.3172e7 kg · m2
ρ, c 1.225 kg · m−3, 4.19 m
α0, γ0, Tmax 0°, 8°, 300 kN
CLg , CDg , μ 1.2, 0.05, 0.1
Cmq , Cmue −44.43, −1.785
A3, B3 Cmq ; Cmue  × 1∕2IyyρV2mcgSref c
A4, B4 Cmq ; Cmue  × 1∕2IyyρV2RSref c
K1, K3, K5, K7 −3
K2, K4, K6, K8 0.1
θPR, θTS, θng, θtail, hTS, hlof 3°, 9°, 3°, 10°, 0.9 m, 2.5 m
θrefmin ; θrefmax , Vrmin ; Vrmax  (7°, 13°), 50; 70 ms−1Kpmin ; Kpmax , τmin; τmax −5;−1, (0, 0.1) s
Vmcg, V1, VR, V lof , V2, Vfp 10, 47, 55, 66, 67.5, 80 ms
−1
θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5, θ6 −2°, 3°, 5°, 8°, 9°, 15°
h1, h2, h3, h4 −5, 1, 2.5, 15 m
No. of Monte Carlo trials 1000































































Cmq , Cmue were chosen from [53]. The remaining parameters were chosen to reflect a typical twin-jet transport aircraft such as B737
or A320.
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